Odds of Guessing a 4-Digit PIN

Last updated: September 25, 2026

The odds of guessing a 4-digit PIN in 3 tries are not 0.03%. In 29 million leaked PINs analysed by ABC News in 2025, the three most common codes (1234, 1111 and 0000) cover 11.7% of all PINs, about 1 in 8.5.

Key findings

  • Three guesses cover 11.7% of leaked PINs in ABC's 2025 data and 18.6% in DataGenetics' 2012 data. The equal-odds figure is 0.03%, so real choices make those guesses roughly 390 to 620 times more likely to work.
  • With five guesses, ABC puts the chance at one in eight.
  • 1234 alone is 9.0% of ABC's PINs and 10.7% of DataGenetics'.
  • In DataGenetics' 2012 data, a third of PINs fall within the 61 most common codes, and half within 426.
  • PINs people chose for unlocking a phone hold up better: in the study's no-blocklist groups, 10 guesses got into 4.6% of 4-digit and 6.5% of 6-digit PINs, and the gap between the two was not statistically significant.
  • A large blocklist of 27.4% of all codes cut success after 100 guesses to 1%. Apple's own list of 274 blocked 4-digit PINs is far smaller.

Why the textbook answer is wrong

There are 10,000 possible 4-digit PINs. If people picked them at random, a thief with 3 tries at an ATM would win 0.03% of the time, about 1 in 3,333. That is a common answer, and it is also what Wikipedia's PIN article says.

The math is right. The assumption is not. People pick birthdays, repeated digits and straight lines on the keypad, so a handful of codes cover a large share of real PINs. A guesser who tries the most common ones first does far better than chance.

What leaked PIN data shows

Two large datasets rank 4-digit codes by how often people use them. Neither is made of bank card PINs. Both are four-digit passwords from leaked password lists, which researchers use as a stand-in because real bank PINs are almost never published.

RankABC 2025ShareDataGenetics 2012Share
112349.0%123410.713%
211111.6%11116.016%
300001.1%00001.881%
413420.6%12121.197%
512120.4%77770.745%
622220.3%10040.616%
744440.3%20000.613%
811220.3%44440.526%
919860.3%22220.516%
1020200.3%69690.512%

1234 leads both lists by a wide margin. The rest of the order shifts between datasets: 1111 drops from 6.0% in 2012 to 1.6% in the 2025 data, and 1342, absent from the 2012 top 20, sits fourth in 2025. Different sources and collection methods explain some of this, so treat the exact ranks as approximate and the overall pattern as solid.

Odds of guessing in 3, 5, 10 and 20 tries

These figures add up the published shares of the most common PINs, which is what a guesser who tries them in order would hit.

GuessesEqual oddsABC 2025DataGenetics 2012
30.03%11.7%18.6%
50.05%12.7%20.6%
100.1%14.2%23.3%
200.2%16.5%26.83%

ABC rounds each PIN's share to one decimal place, so its sums could be off by up to about half a point for 10 guesses and a full point for 20. The DataGenetics figures use its three-decimal table.

Equal odds (textbook)every PIN equally likely
0.1%
Phone unlock PINsMarkert et al., 2020
4.6%
Leaked PINsABC News, 2025
14.2%
Leaked PINsDataGenetics, 2012
23.3%
Chance that a guesser gets in within 10 tries. Leaked-PIN figures are the combined share of the 10 most common codes; the phone PIN figure is the study's measured result. Values link to rows F3, F27, F19 and F23 in the data table below.

Is a 6-digit PIN safer?

On paper, yes: there are 1,000,000 possible 6-digit PINs. In practice the gain is small against someone who only gets a few tries. Markert and colleagues asked 1,220 people to choose a PIN for unlocking a phone, then attacked those PINs with guess orders built from real-world PIN datasets: PINs collected by an iPhone lock-screen app for 4 digits, and the RockYou password leak for 6 digits.

Guesses4-digit PINs guessed6-digit PINs guessed
10 (iPhone limit)4.6%6.5%
307.6%8.9%
10016.2%13.3%

The authors found no significant difference between the two lengths at any of these levels. The authors explain that the most common 6-digit choices are more tightly bunched than the most common 4-digit ones, which offsets much of the larger keyspace when a guesser only gets a few tries. These phone PINs were also far harder to guess than the leaked-password lists above. The authors suggest that leaked website passwords are an imperfect stand-in for PINs chosen to unlock a phone, which people are primed to treat more carefully.

Do PIN blocklists help?

Only when they are big. When the study ran, Apple's iOS blocked 274 common 4-digit PINs and 2,910 6-digit ones, and the authors found those lists offered little or no benefit against a guesser with a few tries. A test list blocking 27.4% of all 4-digit codes did work: after 100 guesses, only 1% of PINs had been found.

How to pick a PIN that isn't on these lists

The simplest fix is to let chance pick it. A random PIN generator draws each digit independently, so its output is no more likely to be 1234 than any other code. Avoid anything with a pattern you would recognise: repeated digits, runs, years, and shapes on the keypad. Don't reuse the PIN from your bank card on your phone, and if a service lets you use more digits or a full passphrase, take it.

How this page is built and checked: built by Cedrick Reese for RandomPasswordsGenerator.com. Every figure was opened at its original source on September 25, 2026 and recorded with its publisher, date and data period in the table below and the CSV download. The odds for 3, 5, 10 and 20 guesses are sums of the published per-PIN shares, recalculated in code rather than copied from anyone's summary, and ABC's rounding is flagged where it matters. None of these sources publishes on a schedule, so the page is rechecked once a year and whenever a new peer-reviewed PIN study or large breach analysis appears.

Full data table

Each row has its own link, so you can cite a single figure (for example odds-of-guessing-a-pin.html#F17).

Download this data (CSV)

IDFigureValueSourceMethod
F1Chance of guessing a 4-digit PIN in 3 tries if every PIN were equally likely0.03 %Computed (arithmetic)computed
F2Same baseline for 5 tries0.05 %Computed (arithmetic)computed
F3Same baseline for 10 tries0.1 %Computed (arithmetic)computed
F4Four-digit passwords analysed by DataGenetics3.4 million passwordsDataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F5Share of DataGenetics dataset that was 123410.713 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F6Share that was 11116.016 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F7Share that was 00001.881 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F8Share covered by the 20 most common PINs26.83 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F9Distinct guesses needed to cover one third of all codes61 guessesDataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F10Distinct guesses needed to pass 50% cumulative426 guessesDataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F11Least used PIN in the DataGenetics dataset: 8068, with 25 occurrences0.000744 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F12PINs analysed by ABC from Have I Been Pwned29 millionABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F13Share of ABC dataset that was 12349.0 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F14Share that was 11111.6 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F15Share that was 00001.1 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F16ABC's stated chance of guessing correctly with five guesses: one in eightone in eight ratioABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F17Chance the top 3 PINs cover a random PIN (ABC data)11.7 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed (medium)
F18Chance with the top 5 (ABC data)12.7 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed (medium)
F19Chance with the top 10 (ABC data)14.2 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed (medium)
F20Chance with the top 20 (ABC data)16.5 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed (medium)
F21Chance with the top 3 (DataGenetics data)18.61 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)computed
F22Chance with the top 5 (DataGenetics data)20.552 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)computed
F23Chance with the top 10 (DataGenetics data)23.335 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)computed
F24How many times more likely 3 tries succeed vs the uniform assumption (ABC data)390 xABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed
F25Same comparison using DataGenetics data620 xDataGenetics (Nick Berry)computed
F26Participants in the Markert et al. smartphone PIN study1220 peopleMarkert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F274-digit phone PINs guessed within 10 tries (the iOS maximum)4.6 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F286-digit phone PINs guessed within 10 tries6.5 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F294-digit PINs guessed within 30 tries7.6 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F306-digit PINs guessed within 30 tries8.9 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F314-digit PINs guessed within 100 tries16.2 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F326-digit PINs guessed within 100 tries13.3 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F33PINs on Apple's iOS 4-digit blocklist274 PINsMarkert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F34PINs on Apple's iOS 6-digit blocklist2910 PINsMarkert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F354-digit PINs guessed within 100 tries when a 2,740-PIN blocklist was enforced1 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F36Possible 4-digit PINs (0000 to 9999)10000 PINsComputed (arithmetic)computed
F37Possible 6-digit PINs1000000 PINsComputed (arithmetic)computed
F38Uniform-choice odds of 3 guesses, expressed as 1 in N3333Computed (arithmetic)computed
F39Uniform-choice odds of 20 guesses0.2 %Computed (arithmetic)computed
F40Top-3 odds in ABC data, expressed as 1 in N8.5ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)computed (medium)
F41Top-3 odds in DataGenetics data, expressed as 1 in N5.4DataGenetics (Nick Berry)computed
F42Share of the 4-digit keyspace blocked by the large test blocklist27.4 %Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct
F43Occurrences of 8068, the least used PIN, in the DataGenetics dataset25 occurrencesDataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F44DataGenetics rank 4: 12121.197 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F45DataGenetics rank 5: 77770.745 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F46DataGenetics rank 6: 10040.616 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F47DataGenetics rank 7: 20000.613 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F48DataGenetics rank 8: 44440.526 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F49DataGenetics rank 9: 22220.516 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F50DataGenetics rank 10: 69690.512 %DataGenetics (Nick Berry)direct
F51ABC rank 4: 13420.6 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F52ABC rank 5: 12120.4 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F53ABC rank 6: 22220.3 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F54ABC rank 7: 44440.3 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F55ABC rank 8: 11220.3 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F56ABC rank 9: 19860.3 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F57ABC rank 10: 20200.3 %ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation)direct
F58PINs in the large test blocklist (DD-4-digit-2740)2740 PINsMarkert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020)direct

Methodology and limitations

  • Leaked datasets are four-digit passwords, not bank PINs. DataGenetics analysed about 3.4 million four-digit passwords from leaked lists. ABC counted 29 million four-digit entries in Have I Been Pwned's Pwned Passwords data and called it "not a perfect data set". Both are proxies.
  • Computed odds assume the guesser knows the ranking. Adding up the top 3, 5, 10 or 20 shares gives the success rate for someone who tries the most common codes first, which is what published attacks do.
  • ABC's shares are rounded to one decimal place, so ABC-based sums carry a medium confidence rating in the data table.
  • The phone study used an online panel of 1,220 people on Amazon Mechanical Turk, primed to pick a phone unlock PIN. A later journal version of the same work reports a different participant total; this page uses the 2020 conference figure.
  • DataGenetics' page shows no date. Its address points to September 2012.

Sources

  1. ABC News (Australian Broadcasting Corporation). "Almost one in 10 people use the same four-digit PIN." Published January 28, 2025, updated February 14, 2025. abc.net.au
  2. DataGenetics (Nick Berry). "PIN number analysis." 2012. datagenetics.com
  3. Markert, Bailey, Golla, Dürmuth, Aviv (IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy 2020). "This PIN Can Be Easily Guessed: Analyzing the Security of Smartphone Unlock PINs." arXiv:2003.04868

How to cite this page

Reese, C. (2026). Odds of Guessing a 4-Digit PIN: Real Data, Not 1 in 10,000. RandomPasswordsGenerator.com. Last updated September 25, 2026. https://randompasswordsgenerator.com/odds-of-guessing-a-pin.html

Frequently asked questions

What are the odds of guessing a 4-digit PIN?

If every PIN were equally likely, 3 guesses would succeed 0.03% of the time, about 1 in 3,333. Real choices are far less even: in ABC's 2025 analysis of 29 million leaked PINs, the 3 most common codes covered 11.7% of them.

What is the rarest 4-digit PIN?

In DataGenetics' 2012 dataset of 3.4 million four-digit passwords, the least used was 8068, which appeared 25 times. Once a PIN is published as rare it stops being a good choice, so a randomly generated PIN is the safer pick.

Is a 6-digit PIN safer than a 4-digit PIN?

Not by much against someone who only gets a few tries. In a 2020 study where 1,220 people chose phone unlock PINs, 10 guesses unlocked 4.6% of 4-digit PINs and 6.5% of 6-digit PINs, and the difference was not statistically significant (figures from the study's no-blocklist groups).